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In re RAYNATOM CARMEN, on Habeas Corpus. 
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[1] Habeas Corp1l&-Want of Jurisdiction-Showing on Face of 
Record.-In the absence of exceptional circumstances, peti-
tioner on habeas corpus may not contest, in his collateral attack 
on final judgments of conviction, the trial court's determination 
and exercise of jurisdiction on the basis of new and additional 
facts that do not appear in the trial court record. 
[2] ld.-Want of Jurisdiction-Showing on Face of B.ecord.-
Traditionally, the inquiry on habeas corpus has been limited 
to an examination of facts appearing on the face of the record 
and no evidence dehors the record has been received to im-
peach the judgment, though the scope of inquiry has been 
extended to embrace additional evidence in instances where 
petitioner contested the validity of a final judgment of con-
viction on the ground that he had been denied the aid of 
counsel, that his conviction had been secured solely by per-
jured testimony knowingly used by prosecuting officials, or 
that the law under which he had been convicted was uncon-
stitutional. 
[3] ld.-Want of Jurisdiction-Showing on Face of Record.-
Departure from the traditional scope of inquiry on habeas 
corpus, so as to permit consideration of new and additional 
facts that do not appear in the trial court record, is not war-
ranted where petitioner's claims of lack of jurisdiction are 
based entirely on federal statutes, the effect of which has been 
changed since petitioner committed his offenses, by legislation 
giving the courts of this state unquestioned jurisdiction over 
offenses committed in "All Indian country within the State!' 
(18 U.S.C. § 1162.) 
[4] ld.-Want of Jurisdiction-Showing on Face of Record.-
Where petitioner had opportunity to raise a jurisdictional 
question by presenting the alleged facts at his trial, but he 
failed to do so and, on the facts there alleged and proved, the 
trial court's implied determination that it had jurisdiction 
was correct, he cannot relitigate that issue on habeas corpus. 
[5] Criminal Law - Jurisdiction. - Federal jurisdiction over of-
fenses committed within the state, which offenses are defined 
by state law, is exceptional and, in trials in the courts- in this 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Habeas Corpus, § 17; Am.Jur., Habeas Corpna, 
§§ 26, 27. 
KcK. Dig. Befere~ces: [1-4] Habeaa Corpus, 110; [6] Criminal 
Law,17i. ' 
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state, claims of federal jurisdiction are ordinarily defensive 
matter. 
PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from 
custody. Writ denied. 
Mason A. Bailey and Leonard J. Bloom for Petitioner. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn, 
Assistant Attorney General, and Arlo E. Smith, Deputy At-
torney General, for Respondent. 
SPENCE, J.-Petitioner, Rayna Tom Carmen, is confined 
in the state prison at San Quentin under judgments of con-
viction of first degree murder and of assault with intent to 
commit murder. He seeks his release from custody upon 
alleged jurisdictional grounds. 
Petitioner was first convicted of the two offenses in the 
Superior Court of Madera County in 1950. Wilbur Dan 
McSwain was the victim of the murder and Alvin McSwain 
was the victim of the assault. The crimes were committed 
near the home of the victims. The initial altercation between 
the parties had occurred earlier the same morning at a point 
in Madera County some miles distant from the scene of the 
crimes. After that altercation petitioner had driven to his 
home, had obtained a gun, and had then driven to the home 
of the victims to await their return. The shooting occurred 
immediately following their return, while Alvin McSwain was 
still in an automobile and Wilbur Dan McSwain was standing 
near it. 
At the first trial it was alleged and proved that the crimes 
had been committed in Madera County. Petitioner was con-
victed of both offenses and was sentenced to imprisonment for 
the term prescribed by law on the assault count and to suffer 
the death penalty on the murder count. Upon appeal, this 
court affirmed the assault conviction and reversed the murder 
conviction. (People v. Carmen, 36 Ca1.2d 768 [228 P.2d 
281] .) 
At the second trial in the Superior Court of Madera 
County petitioner was again convicted of first degree murder 
for the killing of Wilbur Dan McSwain and was again 
sentenced to suffer the death penalty. It was again alleged 
and proved that the murder had been committed in Madera 
County. 
At the time of oral argument before this court on the appeal 
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from the second murder conviction, it was suggested for the 
first time that facts might be adduced showing that the 
murder had been committed on a small tract of land within 
Madera County known as an "Indian allotment," that such 
allotment constituted "Indian country," and that petitioner 
was an "Indian," within the meaning of those terms as used in 
certain federal statutes, with the result that exclusive juris-
diction over the offense might be vested in the federal courts. 
(See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1151, 1152, 1153, and 3242, as amended 
May 24, 1949.) Petitioner thereupon filed an application to 
produce on the appeal additional evidence relating to the 
newly suggested facts. This court denied the application and 
affirmed the second judgment of conviction. (People v. 
Carmen, 43 CaL2d 342 [273 P.2d 521J.) Noting that the 
facts shown in the trial court record were insufficient to show 
exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts, this court stated 
that "Since the defendant committed the crime in a county 
of this state, it may not be assumed that any special circum-
stances existed which would deprive the state of jurisdiction." 
(P.349.) 
Thereafter petitioner commenced this habeas corpus pro-
ceeding, claiming a lack of jurisdiction in the courts of this 
state on the basis of allegations that he and the McSwains were 
"Indian!:" and that the murder and the assault had been 
committed in "Indian country." Because of the alleged 
jurisdictional questions involved, this court issued a writ of 
habeas corpus and made an order of reference for the purpose 
of determining the status of petitioner and Wilbur Dan Mc-
Swain, as well as the locus of the crimes. Hearings were 
conducted and the referee filed his findings with this court. 
The People contend that the evidence is insufficient to sus-
tain the referee's findings concerning the status of petitioner 
and Wilbur Dan McSwain. Upon further consideration, how-
ever, we have concluded that it is unnecessary to determine the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the referee's findings or 
the adequacy of said findings. [1] We have reached this 
conclusion because we are of the opinion that in the absence 
of exceptional circumstances, which are not present here, 
petitioner may uot contest, in this collateral attack upon the 
final jUdgments of conviction, the trial court's determination 
and exercise of jurisdiction, upon the basis of new and addi-
tional facts which do not appear in the trial court record. 
[2] We are he-fe concerned with the nature of the inquiry 
which may be made on habeas corpus where it is claimed that 
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a trial court of general jurisdiction lacked jurisdiction over 
an offense by reason of the status of the parties involved and 
the place at which the crime occurred Traditionally the in-
quiry on habeas corpus has been limited to an examination of 
facts appearing upon the face of the record and no evideuce 
dehors the record has been received to impeach the jUdgment. 
(In re Selvwsky, ]89 Cal. 331 [208 P. 99] ; In re Stevenson, 
187 Cal. 773 [204 P. 216] ; In re Nicholson, 24 Cal.App.2d 15 
[74 P.2d 288] ; In re Mirando, 15 Cal.App.2d 443 [59 P.2d 
544J ; In re Murphy, 79 Cal.App. 64 [248 P. 1044J; In re 
Ballas, 53 Cal.App. 109 [199 P. 816] ; In re Todd, 44 Cal.App. 
496 [186 P. 790] ; see also 39 C.J.S., Habeas Corpus, § 16, p. 
456.) However, it was said in In re Oonnor, 16 Ca1.2d 701, 
712 [108 P.2d 10], that cc [t]he scope of inquiry on habeas 
corpus in this state may ... under exceptional circumstances, 
extend over the entire course of proceedings in the lower 
courts ... and may embrace additional evidence received by 
this court either directly or under an order of reference." 
The scope of inquiry has been so extended in instances where 
a petitioner has contested the validity of a final judgment of 
conviction upon the ground that he had been denied the aid 
of counsel (In re Oonnor, supra, 16 Cal.2d 701) ; or that his 
conviction had been secured solely by perjured testimony 
knowingly used by prosecuting officials (In re Mooney, 10 Cal. 
2d 1 [73 P.2d 554]) ; or that the law under which he had been 
convicted was unconstitutional (In re Bell, 19 Ca1.2d 488 [122 
P.2d 22]). 
[3] The asserted grounds of claimed lack of jurisdiction in 
the instant case, however, do not appear to be of such nature 
as would warrant a departure from the traditional scope of 
inquiry or would permit the consideration of new and addi-
tional facts alleged by petitioner-which do not appear in the 
trial court record. The situation here presented is not one in 
which the asserted lack of jurisdiction is based upon a claim 
by petitioner that he was convicted of violating an unconsti-
tutional law or was denied any fundamental constitutional 
right. (See In re Bell, supra, 19 Ca1.2d 488, 501-502.) On 
the contrary, petitioner's claims are based entirely upon fed-
eral statutes (18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1151, 1152, 1153, and 3242), the 
effect of which has been changed since petitioner committed his 
offenses, by legislation giving the courts of this state unques-
tioned jurisdiction over offenses committed in "All Indian 
country within the state." (18 U.S.C.A. § 1162, as amended 
Aug. 24, 1954.) . 
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[4] Petitioner had the opportunity to raise the jurisdic-
tional question here involved by presenting the alleged facts 
at his trials. He failed to do so and, upon the facts there 
alleged and proved, the trial court's implied determination 
that it had' jurisdiction over the offenses was correct.' To 
permit petitioner to now relitigate that issue would encourage 
defendants charged with crimes, the jurisdiction over which 
might depend upon complex factual determinations, to with-
hold the raising of those issues until after they had attempted 
to obtain a favorable result at a trial on the merits, and 
perha.ps until such time as a conviction by the court claimed 
to have jurisdiction would be impossible by reason of the 
statute of limitations, or otherwise. (See Ex parte Wallace, 
infra, 81 Okla. Crim. 176 [162 P.2d 205].) The sanction of 
such procedure would permit piecemeal litigation of factual 
issues which should be finally determined upon a single trial. 
[5] Federal jurisdiction over offenses which are committed 
within the boundaries of this state and which are defined by 
state law is exceptional and, in trials in the courts of this state, 
such jurisdictional claims are ordinarily defensive matter. 
(See People v. Collins, 105 Cal. 504, 509 [89 P. 16].) Peti-
tioner therefore should have alleged and proved in the trial 
court any facts which he now claims might have had the 
effect of vesting exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts. 
The foregoing conclusions are supported by both state and 
federal authority. In State v. Utecht, 220 Minn. 481 [19 
N.W.2d 706, 161 A.L.R. 1316], and Ex parte Wallace, IUpra, 
81 Okla Crim. 176 [162 P.2d 205], the problem presented was 
almost identical with that involved here. Petitioners therein 
by collateral attack on habeas corpus attempted for the first 
time to contest the jurisdiction of the state courts of general 
jurisdiction which had convicted them. It was claimed that 
petitioners were "Indians" and that the crimes of which 
they had been convicted had been committed in "Indian 
country." Relief was deni.ed in both cases upon the ground 
that the determination of jurisdiction by a trial court of gen-
eral jurisdiction was not subject to collateral attack on habeas 
corpus where petitioners had not contested the jurisdiction of 
the court at the trial nor brought to the trial court's attention 
facts from which lack of jurisdiction could have been deter-
mined, and where upon the face of the trial court record there 
was no showing of .lack of jurisdiction. (See also 89 C.J.S., 
Habeas Corpus,. f16, p. 456; 25 Am.Jur., Habeas Corpus, 
§ 26, p. 161.) While in neither of the cited cases did peti-
-.) 
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tioner attempt to raise the jurisdictional question upon appeal 
as was done in the instant case, the attempt herein, as hereto-
fore noted, was unsuccessful. (People v. Carmen, supra, 43 
Ca1.2d 342.) That factor, therefore, would not appear to be 
a distinguishing one. 
On numerous occasions the federal courts have likewise 
held that a final judgment of conviction may not be attacked 
on habeas corpus upon allegations of new and additional facts 
claimed to show that the convicting court lacked jurisdiction 
over the offense because of the alleged status of the parties 
or the alleged place where the crime was committed, at least 
when there was no affirmative showing of lack of jurisdiction 
upon the face of the trial court record. (Toy Toy v. Hopkins, 
212 U.S. 542 [29 S.Ct. 416, 53 L.Ed. 644] ; Davis v. Johnston, 
144 F.2d 862; Hatten v. Hudspeth, 99 F.2d 501; Ex parte 
Savage, 158 F. 205; see also Rodman v. Pothier, 264 U.S. 399 
[44 S.Ot. 360, 68 L.Ed. 759] ; In re Linooln, 202 U.S. 178 [26 
S.Ct. 602, 50 L.Ed. 984] ; Walsh v. Johnston, 115 F.2d 806; 
Walsh v. Aroher, 73 F.2d 197; Aroher v. Heath, 30 F.2d 932; 
United States v. Lair, 195 F. 47 [115 C.C.A. 49].) 
Certain of the cited federal cases involved petitioners claim-
ing that the federal courts which had convicted them lacked 
jurisdiction because the petitioners therein were C • allotted 
Indians" and no longer wards of the government (Toy Toy v. 
Hopkins, supra; Ex parte Savage, supra), or that the locus of 
the crime was no longer "Indian country" (Toy Toy v. 
Hopkins, supra ; Davis v. Johnston, supra; Hatte1'/. v. Huds-
peth, supra). In each instance the court refused to redeter-
mine the question of jurisdiction. Moreover, the refusal was 
not made dependent upon whether the jurisdictional issue had 
been raised at the trial or whether at the time of trial peti-
tioner was aware of the facts upon which the alleged lack of 
jurisdiction was later asserted. Thus in Davis v. Johnston, 
supra, 144 F.2d 862, it was said: "In appellant's petition 
he states that he did not object to the jurisdiction of the 
court in the trial of the criminal case for the reason, he 
now alleges that he was not aware of the fact that the store 
building in which the crime was committed was not within the 
reservation. The decision of the court in the criminal case 
upon the factual question of jurisdiction is equally conclusive 
whether or not it was raised by the defendant." 
The case of Tooisgah v. United States, 186 F.2d 93, is Dot 
helpful to petitioner. There an Indian sought redetermination 
of the trial court's jurisdiction by a motion to vacate under 
) 
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section 2255, title 28, United States Code Annotated. The 
court, one judge dissenting, reexamined the question of juris-
diction, found as a matter of law that it was lacking, and 
directed that the judgment be vacated. The court was careful, 
however, to distinguish two of the above cited cases, stating 
at pages 95·96: "Unlike Hatten v. Hudspeth, 10 Cir., 99 
F.2d 501, and Davis v. Johnston, 9 Cir., 144 F.2d 862, no new 
or additional facts are sought to be injected into the case, 
and no adjudicated facts are sought to be impeached." It 
appears clear from the quoted language that the present case is 
likewise distinguishable, since we determined on the second 
appeal (People v. Oarmen, supra, 43 Ca1.2d 342) that there 
were no facts in the trial court record which showed lack of 
jurisdiction in the trial court. Petitioner's claim is therefore 
wholly dependent upon new and additional facts which he 
seeks to inject into this proceeding as the basis for his col-
lateral attack. Under the rule established by the numerous 
state and federal decisions, such collateral attack is not per-
mitted under the circumstances j and if there may be said to 
be anything in the opinions in State ex reI. Irvine v. District 
Oourt, 125 Mont. 398 [239 P.2d 272], or Application of Andy, 
49 Wn.2d 449 [302 P.2d 963], which lends support to peti-
tioner's position, it is to that extent out of harmony with the 
established rule and should not be followed. 
The established rule was clarified but not modified in Bowen 
v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 27 [59 S.Ct. 442, 83 L.Ed. 455], 
where it was said that the traditional limitations on inquiry 
on habeas corpus may, in some situations, "yield to exceptional 
circumstances where the need for the remedy afforded by the 
writ of habeas corpus is apparent." The court there deter-
mined that the important and unanswered conflict then exist-
ing between federal and state authorities concerning the 
purely legal question of their respective claims to jurisdiction 
over a national park constituted such "exceptional circum-
stances. " , 
The trial court record "there showed that the murder had 
been committed "on the Government Reservation known as 
the Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Park within the 
exterior limits of the State of Georgia" (p. 21) j and "The 
sole question was whether this Park was within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the United States" (p. 23). The question of 
jurisdiction was therefore a "quf'Rtion of law" (p. 27) rather 
than of fact, as it-depended solely "upon the terms of the 
consent or cession given by the legislature of Georgia," of 
858 IN D CAltJrlBN' [48 C.2d _________________________________________________ 1 
which the court took "judicial notice." (P. 23.) The court \ 
there determined as a matter of law that the federal court 
had jurisdiction and it affirmed the judgment of the Circuit 
Court, which affirmed the judgment of the District Court 
denying the petition for habeas corpus. No attempt had been 
made in that case to present any new or additional facts con-
cerning jurisdiction in the habeas corpus proceeding. The 
court there merely found "exceptional circumstances" to jus-
tify its determination on habeas corpus of an important ques-
tion of law following a final judgment of conviction. The 
discussion in that case of the decisions in Toy Toy v. Hopkins, 
""pra, 212 U.S. 542, Rodman v. Pothier, IUpra, 264 U.S. 399, 
and Walsh v. Archer, supra, 73 F.2d 197, clearly shows that 
the court did not intend to modify the general rule established 
by those decisions. (See Davis v. Johnston, ""pra, 144 F.2d 
862, 863.) 
Similarly, the case of Ez parte Van Moore, 221 F. 954, 
was found to present "exceptional circumstances" in that 
long after petitioner's conviction in the state court of South 
Dakota, the United States Supreme Court had determined 
as a matter of law, contrary to the prior determinations of the 
courts of South Dakota and other jurisdictions, that Indian 
allotments held in trust outside of Indian reser:vations had at 
all times been within the meaning of "Indian country" as 
that term was used in the federal statutes. As the court said 
at page 971," IT]he recent determination of the questions here 
involved by the Supreme Court of the United States in re 
U.S. v. Pelican, supra [232 U.S. 442 (34 s.et. 396, 58 L.Ed. 
676) ], at variance with the rule announced by the Supreme 
Court of the state on denying his application for a release, 
constitutes exceptional circumstances, and justifies the issu-
ance of the writ .... " It is apparent that the instant case 
involves no such exceptional circumstances as were present in 
Bowen v. Johnston, supra, and Ex parte Van Moore, supra. 
Contrary to petitioner's claim the eases of In re Seeley, 
29 Ca1.2d 294 [176 P.2d 24], and In re McVickers, 29 Ca1.2d 
264 [176 P.2d 40], lend no support to his position. Neither 
of these cases involved an attack upon a final judgment of 
conviction but were concerned only with the question of 
habitual criminal status. This court recognized the distinc-
tion when it said in In re Seeley, supra, at page 299, in re-
ferring to the decisjon in In re McVickers, supra: "In that 
case it was held,tbat an adjudication of habitual criminal 
status is not a judgment of conviction but is, in effect, only an 
) 
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ancillary and severable determination of a fact pertinent to 
the length of imprisonment and right to parole, and hence 
that such determination is not necessarily characterized by 
the high degree of finality of a final judgment of conviction." 
The federal courts have distinguished, as we have here, 
between habeas corpus proceedings involving claims of lack 
of jurisdiction upon grounds similar to those here involved 
and those wherein a petitioner has contested jurisdiction on the 
ground that he was denied due process of law at his trial. 
Thus while the federal courts, as appears from the cited 
authorities, have consistently refused to redetermine ques-
tions of status of the parties or the locus of the crime on the 
basis of facts not appearing on the face of the trial court 
record, they have shown a willingness to look to evidence 
dehors the record where a petitioner has claimed that he has 
been denied his fundamental constitutional rights. (See 
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 [58 8.0t. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 
146 A.L.R. 357] ; Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 [55 S.Ot. 
340, 79 L.Ed. 791, 98 A.L.R. 406] ; Moore v. Dempsey, 261 
U.S. 86 [43 S.Ct. 265, 67 L.Ed. 543] ; Frank v. Mangum, 237 
U.S. 309 [35 S.Ot. 582, 59 L.Ed. 969] ; see also United States 
ex reI. McCann v. Adams, 320 U.S. 220 [64 S.Ot. 14, 88 L.Ed. 
4] ; Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 [62 S.Ct. 964, 86 L.Ed. 
1302].) , . 
It therefore appears that both reason and authority sup-
port the view that no exceptional circumstances are presented 
here and that our inquiry in this proceeding is limited to the 
record of the trial court in which the final judgments of con-
viction were entered. Having concluded that we may not 
here consider new and additional facts concerning the juris-
diction of the Superior Court of Madera County over the 
offenses of which petitioner was convicted, it follows that peti-
tioner's allegation are insufficient to entitle him to any relief 
in this proceeding. 
The writ is discharged and -petitioner is remanded to cus-
tody. 
Gibson, O. J., Shenk, J., and McOomb, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
The conclusion reached by the majority here is predicated 
upon the assumption that the scope of review on habeas corpus 
in a case such as tl;lis' is limited to matters appearing upon 
the face of the record and that a reviewing court may not 
) 
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consider pertinent facts aliunde the record even though such 
facts are conclusively established and it appears beyond doubt 
that the tribunal whose judgment is subject to review was 
without jurisdiction to hear and determine tbe cause and 
render the judgment which is the subject of review in the 
habeas corpus proceeding. In so holding the majority has 
ignored or misapplied several recent decisions both by this 
court and by the Supreme Court of the United States in which 
relief was obtained by means of habeas corpus where the in-
quiry extended beyond the record on which the judgment 
subject to review was based. 
The most recent of these cases is that of Chessman v. Tut., 
354 U.S. 156 [77 S.Ot. 1127, 1 L.Ed.2d 1253], decided by 
the Supreme Court of the United States on June 10, 1957. 
The background of the Chessman case should be well known 
to every member of this court. It will be remembered that 
on the 21st day of May, 1948, Chessman was found guilty of 
17 felonies by a jury in the Superior Court of Los Angeles 
County and on June 25, 1948, sentence of death was pro-
nounced against him. The court reporter who reported the 
proceedings at the trial died after only 646 out of 1,810 pages 
of the trial transcript had been dictated into a recording 
machine. Thereafter the deputy district attorney who prose-
cuted Chessman arranged with one Stanley Fraser who was 
an uncle of the wife of the said deputy district attorney to I 
transcribe the remaining notes of the deceased reporter. The 
purported transcription of these notes extended over several 
months and finally a purported record was submitted to the 
trial court, and in the absence of Chessman or his counsel, 
testimony was offered on behalf of the prosecution with re-
spect to the accuracy of said record which was finally ap-
proved by the trial jUdge. The proceedings for the settlement 
of said record were attacked by Chessman before both the 
trial court and this court, but this court affirmed the order 
of the trial court on May 19, 1950, with two justices dissent-
ing (People v. Chessman, 35 Ca1.2d 455 [218 P.2d 769, 19 
A.L.R.2d 1084]). Thereafter the case was presented to this 
court on the record so approved and the judgment of death 
pronounced against Chessman was affirmed with the same two 
justices dissenting (People v. Chessman, 38 Ca1.2d 166 [238 
P.2d 1001]). Petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court of 
the United States was thereafter denied (Chessman v. Cali-
fornia, 343 U.S. 915 [72 S.Ot. 650, 96 L.Ed. 1330]). There-
after, and on July '16, 1954, Chessman presented to this court 
) 
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a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that 
he was denied due process of law because of fraud perpctrated 
by the prosecution in the transcription and settlement of said 
record, alleging in his said petition certain facts which were 
not known to him at the time the other proceedings above 
mentioned were before this court. This I!ourt denied said peti-
tion on July 21, 1954, and certiorax:i to the Supreme Court 
of the United States was later denied without prejudice to 
Che.ssman applying for a writ of habeas corpus to a federal 
district court (Chessman v. CaZ·ifornia, 348 U.S. 864 {75 S.Ct. 
85, 99 L.Ed. 681]). He later applied to the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of California, South-
ern Division, alleging substantially the same facts which were 
contained in his application for habeas corpus to the Supreme 
Court of California. This application was summarily denied 
by Judge Goodman of the United States District Court, and 
his decision was affirmed by the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the 9th Circuit (Chessman v. Teets, 221 F.2d 276). 
The Supreme Court of th~ United States thereafter reversed 
the 9th Circuit Court uf Appeals and Judge Goodman and 
directed that Chessman be given a hearing on his application 
(Chessman v. Teets, 350 U.S. 3 [76 S.Ct. 34, 100 L.Ed. 4]). 
He was thereafter given a hearing by Judge Goodman who 
denied him any relief and Judge Goodman's decision was af-
firmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th (lir-
cuit, one judge dissenting (Chessman v. Teets, 239 F.2d 205). 
Thereafter the Supreme Court of the United States granted a 
writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the 9th Circuit, and on June 10, 1957, reversed the decision of 
the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals and Judgc Goodman, holding 
squarely that Chessman had been denied due process of law 
by the proceeding in the trial court which purported to settle 
the record on which this court affirmed his conviction. The 
effect of this decision is to render null and void, not only 
Judge Goodman's decision, but the order of the state trial 
court approving the trial record and all of the decisions of 
this court in denying Chessman relief. 
In its opinion the Supreme Court of the United States 
declared: "On October 17, 1955, this Court, reversing the 
Court of Appeals, remanded to the District Court for a hear-
ing petitioner's applicat.ion for a writ of habeas corpus, charg-
ing fraud in the prep-atation of the state court r:f!cord, which 
had been summarily dismissed by the District Court. 350 
U.S. 3 [76 8.Ct. 34, 100 L.Ed. 4]. This resulted in the judg-
) 
l' 
.j 
1 
862 IN BE CARMEN [48 c.241 
ment which is now before us. The District Court held that no \ 
fraud had been shown. The record of proceedings held before I 
District Judge Goodman reveals the following additional fact, I 
as to the preparation of the state court record, none of which I 
appear to be disputed by the State, which has been ably and I 
conscientiously represented here: Fraser, the substitute re- ' 
porter, was an uncle by marriage of the deputy district at-
torney in charge of this case, a fact of which neither the .tate 
trial court nor the appellate court were aware when they ap-
proved the transcript. In preparing the transcript, Fraser 
worked in close collaboration with the prosecutor, and also 
went over with two police officers, who testified for the State 
at the trial, his transcription of their testimony. Tht latter 
episodes were likewise tlrtknown to the state court. when they I 
approved the transcript. The testimony of one of these of-
ficers concerned petitioner's alleged confession, a subject of 
dispute at the trial, and petitioner's list of alleged inaccuracies, 
already mentioned, related to some of that testimony. It also 
appeared at this hearing that Fraser had destroyed the 'rough' 
draft of his transcription which petitioner had sought to ob-
tain during the settlement proceedings. 
"Under the circumstances which have been summarized, 
we must hold that the ex parte settlement of this state court 
record violated petitioner's constitutional right to procedural 
due process . ... [Footnotes 12 and 13:] 
"In view of our holding we cannot regard ourselves as 
concluded by the California Supreme Court's holdings that 
the record on which it acted was adequate as a matter of 
state law, and that, in any event, the inaccuracies then claimed 
by the petitioner would not have changed the result of his 
appeal. Petitioner is entitled to have his conviction reviewed 
upon a record which has been settled in accordance with pro-
cedural due process. Moreover, in holding as it did the state 
court was not aware of the fact lafer developed in hearings 
before Judge Goodman, see p. 5, supra, and we cannot know 
that those facts, and others that might be disclosed upon an 
adversary hearing focused squarely on the adequacy of the 
transcript, would not lead it to a different conclusion. 
"Certainly this Court's previous denials of certiorari, 350 
U.S. 840 [71 S.Ct. 29, 95 L.Ed. 616] ; 341 U.S. 929 [71 S.Ot. 
800, 95 L.Ed. 1359]; 343 U.S. 915 [72 S.Ct. 650, 96 L.Ed. 
1330] ; 346 U.S. 916 [74 8.Ct. 278, 98 L.Ed. 412] j 348 U.S. 
864 [75 S.Ct. 85,99 L.Ed. 681], do not foreclose us from now 
granting appropriate relief. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 
) 
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[73 S.Ot. 897, 97 L.Ed. 469]. And it tMy be ",oted tkat. it 
was ",ot "",til the present proceeding. in the District COUt"t 
tka.f tke fact. IUfTounding tke ,etflement of the ,tate oov,rt 
record were ftilly developed." (Emphasis added.) 
From the foregoing excerpt from the decision of the Su-
preme Court of the United States in the Chessman case it is 
manifest that the Supreme Court considered numerous facts 
entirely outside of the record both of the trial court and this 
court· when the Chessman case was being considered by the 
courts of this state. 
There can be no question but that the effect of the holding 
of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Chessman 
ease is"that the ez parle settlement of this state court record 
violated petitioner'8 constitutional right to procedural due 
process. " Such being the case, the question arises as to what 
eonstitutes "procedural due process." There can be no ques-
tion but that at least one of the essential elements of "pro-
cedural due process" is a tribunal which has the power to hear 
and determine the rights of the litigants (11 Ca1.Jur.2d p. 
788, § 313 et seq.), and since "procedural due process" may 
be established by proof of facts outside of the record, it must 
necessarily follow that a reviewing court may resort to facts 
outside of the record for the purpose of deterIpining whether 
or not the tribunal rendering the judgment sought to be re-
viewed had jurisdiction of the subject matter of the litigation. 
There can be no escape from this conclusion in view of the 
pronouncements of the Supreme Court of the United States 
in the recent case of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465, 
466,467 [58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 146 A.L.R. 357], where-
in it was declared: "True, habeas corpus cannot be used as a 
means of reviewing errors of law and irregularities--not in-
volving the question of iurisdiction-occurring during the 
course of trial; and the' writ of habeas corpus cannot be used 
as a writ of error.' [Woolsey v. Best, 299 U.S. 1, 2 (57 S.Ct. 
2, 81 L.Ed. 3).] These principles, however, must be con-
strued and applied so as to prcserve--not destroy--constitu-
tional safeguards of human life and liberty. The &9cope of 
inquiry in ha.beas corpus proceedings has been broadened-
not narrowed-since the adoption of the Sixth Amendment. 
In such a proceeding, 'it would be clearly erroneoUs to con-
fine the inquiry to the proceedings and judgment of the triaZ 
court' [Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 327 (35 S.Ct. 582, 
59 L.Ed. 969)] arid the petitioned court has ' powel to inquire 
with regard to tke iurisdiction of tke inferior oov,rl, eithe.-
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in respect to the mbject matter or to the person, even if 8UCh 
inquiry • •• [involves] an examination of facts outside of, 
but Mt incomistent with, tM record.' [In re Mayfield, 141 
U.S. 107, 116 [11 S.Ct. 939, 35 L.Ed. 635] ; Cuddy, Petitioner, 
131 U.S. 280 [9 s.Ot. 703, 33 L.Ed. 154].J Congress has ex-
panded the rights of a petitioner for habeas corpus [28 U.S. C., 
ch. 14, § 451, et seq.] and the ' ••• effect is to substitute for 
the bare legal review that seems to have been the limit of 
judicial authority under the common-law practice, and under 
the Act of 31 Car. II, c. 2, a more searching investigation, ; 
in which the applicant is put upon his oath to set forth the ' 
truth in the matter respecting the causes of his detention, 
and the court, upon determining the actual facts, is to "dis-
pose of the party as law and justice require." 
" 'There being no doubt of the authority of the Congress 
to thus liberalize the common law procedure on habeas corpus 
in order to safeguard the liberty of all persons within the 
jurisdiction of the United States against infringement through 
any violation of the Constitution or a law or treaty established 
thereunder, it results that under the sections cited a prisoner 
in custody pursuant to the final judgment of a state court of 
criminal jurisdiction may have a judicial inquiry in a court ! 
of the United States into the very truth and s:ubstance of the . 
causes of his detention, although it may become necessary 
to look behind and beyond the record of his conviction to II 
sufficien't extent to test the juri.sdiction of the state court to 
proceed to a judgment against him. . . . 
" '. . . it is open to the courts of the United States npon 
an application for a writ of kabeas corpus to look beyond 
forms and inquire into the very substance of the matter, 
,,, (Emphasis added.) Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 
309, 327 [35 S.Ct. 582, 59 L.Ed. 969]; Moore v. Dempsey, 
261 U.S. 86 [43 S.0t. 265, 67 L.Ed. 543J ; Mooney v. Holohan, 
294 U.s. 103 [55 S.Ot. 340,79 L.Ed. 791, 98 A.L.R. 406] ; Hans 
Nielsen, Petitioner, 131 U.S. 176 [9 S.Ot. 672, 33 L.Ed. 
118]. The court concluded with the stateTllent that "The 
judgment of conviction pronounced by a court without juris-
diction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder may obtain 
release by habeas corpu.~. A judge of the Unitf\d States-to 
whom a petition for habeas corpus is addressed--should be 
alert to examine 'the facts for himself when if true as alleged 
they make the tri{11 absolutely void.''' (Moore v. Dempsey, 
261 U.S. 86,92 [43 S.Ot. 265, 67L.Ed. 543] j Patton v. United 
States, 281 U.S. 276, 312, 313 [50 S.Ct. 253, 74 L.Ed. 854, 
, 70 A.L.R. 263].) 
Aug. 1957] IN BE CARlIEN 
(ca C.M 8n: 313 P.2d 81'11 
865 
The holding of the majority in the ease at bar is in direct 
conflict with every decision of the Supreme Court of the 
United States since Prank v. Mangum, tupra, which was 
decided over 40 years ago. 
In Bowen v. Johnston (1939), 806 U.S. 19, 26, 27 [59 S.Ot. 
442, 83 L.Ed. 455] (relied upon by the majority for the 
proposition that "exceptional circumstances" must exist be-
fore evidence outside the record may be examined) habeas 
corpus was denied on the ground that the federal district 
court had exclusive jurisdiction to try the petitioner for 
murder. The petitioner's allegation was that the federal 
court did not have jurisdiction to try him. The United States 
Supreme Court held that the requirement that a litigant resort 
to appellate procedure "is not a rule denying the power to 
issue a writ of habeas corpus when it appears that neverthe-
less the trial court was without jurisdiction. The rule is 
not one defining power but one which relates to the appro-
priate exercise of power." The court then proceeded to 
elaborate by showing that the same circumstances were pres-
ent there that we have in the case at bar. It was said: "[T]he 
rule is not so inflexible that it may not yield to exceptional 
circumstances where the need for the remedy afforded by 
the writ of habeas corpus is apparent. Among these e~cep­
tional circumstances are those indicating a conflict between 
state and federal authorities on a question of law involving 
concerns of large importance affecting their respective juris-
dictions." (Emphasis added.) In the Bowen case evidence 
outside the record was apparently considered inasmuch as 
the district court which had tried petitioner had given no 
consideration to the jurisdictional question since as the court 
stated "The matter stood without any judicial explanation 
and without appeal." (P. 27.) It therefore clearly appears 
that the so-called "exceptional circumstances" present in 
the Bowen case are also present in the case under considera-
tion. 
In Waley v. Johnston (1942),316 U.S. 101, 104 [62 S.Ct. 
964, 86 L.Ed. 1302], habeas corpus was granted on evidence 
outside the record. The court said: "The issue here [whether 
petitioner's plea of guilty had been coerced] was appropri-
ately raised by the habeas corpus petition. The facts relied 
on are dehors the record and their effect on the judgment was 
not open to consideration and review on appeal." (Emphasis 
added.) , . /' 
In Vnifpn .f:ifates ex reZ. McCann v. Adams (1948),320 U.S. , 
.. C.2d-a 
I 
1 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
866 [48 C.2d 
220,221 [648 S.Ot. 14, 88 L.Ed. 4J, habeas corpus was granted 
on petitioner's allegation that he had not intelligently waived 
his right to counsel and a jury trial. The court said: ·'That the 
issue [whether he waived his right to counsel and jury trial], 
ft.OW fairly tendered by the petition for habeas corpus below, 
has never been adjudicated on its merits by the lower courts. 
But it is no longer within the bosom of the trial court. Nor 
can it be disposed of on appeal of his conviction, for the claim 
rests on material dehors the trial proceedings." (Emphasis 
added.) Once again it is apparent that evidence outside 
the record may be considered on a petition for habeas corpus. 
In Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 87, 90 [43 S.Ot. 265, 
67 L.Ed. 543] (decided in 1923 and before the Johnson 
case, 304 U.S. 458 [58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 146 A.L.R. 
357]) habeas corpus was granted on evidence outside the 
record on petitioners' allegation that they had been denied 
due process of law because their convictions of murdering 
a white man had been obtained through mob pressure at a 
trial which lasted three-quarters of an hour. 
In Frank v. Mangum (1915), 237 U.S. 309, 326, 331 [85 
S.Ot. 582, 59 L.Ed. 969], habeas corpus was denied on the 
ground that the state court's prior determination of the 
truth of petitioner's allegations was conclusive. It was held, 
however, that a court of competent jurisdiction was an essen-
tial element of due process; and that while evidence outside 
the record could not be considered at common law, the scope 
of review had been broadened. The court stated: "There 
being no doubt of the authority of the Congress to thus 
liberalize the common law procedure on habeas corpus in 
order to safeguard the liberty of all persons within the juris-
diction of the United States against the infringement through 
any violation of the Constitution or a law or treaty established 
thereunder, it results that under the sections cited a prisoner 
in custody pursuant to the final jUdgment of a state court 
of criminal jurisdiction may have a judicial inquiry in a 
court of the United States into the very truth and substance 
of the cause of his detention although it may become neces-
sary to look behind and beyond the record of his conviction 
to a sufficient extent to test the jurisdiction of the state court 
to proceed to judgment against him." It was also held that 
"In the light, then, of these established rules and principles: 
that due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment had regard to.substance of right, and not to matters of 
form and procedu're: that it is open to the courts of the 
) 
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United States upon an application for a writ of habeas corpus 
to look beyond the forms and inquire into the very substance 
of tke matter • • • whether they appear m the record or 
not . ••. " 
As to the attempt on the part of the majority to distinguish 
cases on the ground that certain specified rights such as 
denial of counsel, use of perjured testimony, and a convic-
tion under an unconstitutional law, is concerned, it should be 
specifically noted that in the case of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 
U.S. 458 [58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 146 A.L.R. 357], the 
court emphatically held that the right to counsel was juris-
dictional, and that when a "jurisdictional question" was 
involved" 'it would be clearly erroneous to confine the inquiry 
to the proceedings and judgment of the trial court.' " 
In the case of Tooisgah v. United States, 186 F.2d 93, 
which the majority holds is "not helpful" to Carmen, the 
question of jurisdiction of the federal district court had been 
raised at the trial and affirmed on appeal. On a collateral 
attack on the jUdgment of conviction based on the ground 
that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction because the land 
on which the crime had been committed was not "Indian 
country," the court reversed its former decision and remanded 
the cause with directions to vacate the judgment and dismiss 
the indictment. It was held that "The question is one of law 
whether the agreed and adjudicated facts bring the offense 
within that class over which exclusive federal jurisdiction is 
extended by statute. Since the motion goes squarely to the 
jurisdiction of the court on agreed facts; involves human 
liberties, as well as a possible conflict between state and 
federal jurisdiction over crimes committed within the bound-
aries of a sovereign state; and since the question of jurisdic-
tion was not presented or painstakingly considered in the 
direct appeal, we deem it appropriate to re-examine it here. " 
(Emphasis added.) On the direct appeal from the judgment 
of conviction Carmen, in the~ase at bar, tried unsuccessfully, 
to raise the question of jurisdiction. A majority of this court 
refused his application but intimated that he might have an-
other remedy. The majority seeks to distinguish the Toosigah 
case on the ground that "no new or additional facts" were 
sought to be injected into the case and "no adjudicated facts 
... sought to be impeached." Davis v. Johnston, 144 F.2d 
862, is not like the caSe at bar. There the pctition(:r for a writ 
of habeas corpus had been tried by the federal district court 
and that court's jurisdiction had been in issue and directly 
) 
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litigated in the lower court and a finding was made thereon. 
In the case at bar the state court assumed jurisdiction and 
this court would not permit the question of lack of jurisdic-
tion to be raised on ~ppea1. In Matter of Heff, 197 U.S. 488 
[25 S.Ct. 506,49 L.Ed. 848], the Supreme Court issued a writ 
of habeas corpus because there was a direct conflict between 
the state and local federal courts on the precise point of law 
involved, each asserting jurisdiction over the same offense. The 
Supreme Court in commenting on its holding in the Neff case 
in In re Lincoln, 202 U.S. 178, 183 [26 S.Ct. 602, 50 L.Ed. 
984], said that the Court of Appeals in the Neff case "had 
already decided the question adversely to the contention of 
petitioner, so that a writ of error from that court would have 
accomplished nothing; and further, that the matter involved 
opened up inquiry into questions of great significance affect-
ing the resj)ective jurisdictions of the nation and the dates 
over large numbers of Indians. There were special reasons, 
therefore, for our issuing a writ of habeas corpus and investi-
gating the matter in that ease." (Emphasis added.) It was ! 
concluded that it could be "assumed that the trial courts 
will follow the rulings of this court, and if there be in any 
ease a departure therefrom the proper appellate court will 
correct the error." In Toy Toy v. Hopkins, 212 U.S. 542, 549 
[29 S.Ct. 416, 53 L.Ed. 644], the Supreme Court, quoting from 
Louisville Trust 00. v. Oomingor, 184 U.S. 18, 25 [22 S.Ct. 
293, 46 L.Ed. 413], said: "Jurisdiction as to the subject-
matter may be limited in various ways, as to civil and crimi-
nal cases; cases at common law or in equity or in admiralty; 
probate cases, or cases under special statutes; to particular 
classes of persons; to proceedings in particular modes; and 
so on. In many cases jurisdiction may depend on the ascer-
tainment of facts in'\'olving the merits, and in that sense the 
court exercises jurisdiction in disposing of the preliminary in-
quiry, although the result may be that it finds that it cannot 
go farther. And where, in a case like that before us, the court 
erroneously retains jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits, its 
action can be corrected on review." (And see United States 
v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563 [27 S.Ct. 165, 51 L.Ed. 319].) 
So far as the rule in this state is concerned, I had thought 
it settled by In re Bell, 19 Cal.2d 488, 501 [122 P.2d 22], 
that a "petitioner seeking habeas corpus, however, is not 
confined to the face of the record in attempting to sustain 
the burden of pro;ving that his convictioll was in violation 
of his constitutional rights. The courts of both the United 
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States and California have declared that the remedy of habeas 
corpus permits an examination not only of the actual evidence 
introduced at petitioner's trial but of any necessary additional 
evidence bearing upon the infringement of petitioner's con-
stitutional rights. (Moore v. Demp$ey, 261 U.S. 86 [43 S.Ct. 
265,67 L.Ed. 543] ; Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 [55 S.Ct. 
340, 79 L.Ed. 791, 98 A.L.R. 406] ; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 
U.S. 242 [57 S.Ct. 732, 81 L.Ed. 1066] ; Johnson v. Zerbst, 
supra; In "e Oonnor, 15 Ca1.2d 161 [99 P.2d 248]; In "e 
Oonnolly, 16 Cal.App.2d 709 [61 P.2d 490] ; In "6 Lake, 65 
Cal.App.420 [224 P.126] ; In r6 Ohaus, 92 Cal.App. 384 [268 
P. 422] ; see, also, Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 [47 S.Ct. 655, 
71 L.Ed. 1108] ; De Jonge v. uregon, 299 U.S. 353 [57 S.Ct. 
255,81 L.Ed. 278]; Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 [55 S.Ct. 
579, 79 L.Ed. 1074); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 [53 
S.Ot. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158, 84 A.L.R. 527).) This examination is 
made, not to pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the verdict, but to determine what the verdict actually 
was, so that the court may decide whether it violates constitu-
tional guaranties. Such an examination will be made in a 
habeas corpus proceeding whenever a petitioner has been 
deprived of due process of law, whatever form that deprivation 
has taken." We also said (In re Oonnor, 16 Ca1.2<l 701, 712, 
713 [108 P.2d 10]) that we had the right, on habeas corpus, 
to inquire into jurisdictional facts whether they appear on 
the face of the record or not and that the scope of the in-
quiry might "embrace additional evidence received by this 
court either directly or under all order of reference. (In r6 
Mooney, 10 Ca1.2d 1 [73 P.2d 554].)" 
It has been held that jurisdiction of a subject matter over 
which a court has otherwise no jurisdiction cannot be con-
ferred by consent, stipulation (Abalian v. 7'ownsend Social 
Oenter, Inc., 112 Cal.App.2d 441 [246 P.2d 965) ; Miller v. 
Miller, 52 Cal.App.2d 443 [126 P.2d 357], agreement (Fletcher 
v. Superior Oourt, 79 Cal.App. 468 [250 P. 195)), acquiescence 
(Fong Ohuck v. Ohin Po Foon, 29 Cal.2d 552 [176 P.2d 705]), 
silence (Tennesen v. Prudential Ins. 00., 8 Cal.App.2d 160 
[47 P.2d 1066]), appearance (Sampsell v. Supe,·ior Oourt, 
32 Cal.2d 763 [197 P.2d 739]), or estoppel (More Estate, 143 
Cal. 493 [77 P. 407]). Jurisdiction of the subject matter 
in any proceeding is Ilonferred by law, and cannot be given, 
enlarged, or waived by tlle parties (Harrington v. Superior 
Oourt, 194 Cal. 185· [228 P. 15]). This means that where 
there is a want of jurisdiction of the subject matter, a pur-
) 
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ported judgment or order is void for all purposes (Fletcher 
v. Superior Court, 79 Cal.App. 468 [250 p, 195]). 
It is appareutly the general rule, both in the federal courts 
and the majority of state courts, that lack of jurisdiction of 
the subject matter may be raised at any time. In 14 American 
Jurisprudence, Courts, section 191, pages 385, 386, the fol-
lowing appears (supported by numerous case citations): 
"Where judicial tribunals have no jurisdiction of the subject 
matter on which they assume to act, their proceedings are 
absolutely void in the strictest sense of the term; and a court 
which is competent to decide on its own jurisdiction in a 
given case may determine that question at any time in the 
proceedings of the cause, whenever that fact is made to appear 
to its satisfaction, either before or after judgment. Accord-
ingly, an objection for want of jurisdiction, if it exists, may 
be raised by answer or at any subsequent stage of the pro-
ceedings; in fact, it may be raised for the first time on appeal. 
A court will recognize want of jurisdiction over the subject 
matter even if no objection is made. Therefore, whenever a 
want of jurisdiction is suggested, by the court's examination 
of the ease or otherwise, it is the duty of the court to consider 
it, for if the court is without jurisdiction, it is powerless to 
act in the ease. 
"A plaintiff against whom judgment went in the lower 
court may on appeal raise the question of the jurisdiction of 
the trial court and have the judgment reversed if the court 
did not have jurisdiction of the subject matter, although the 
assumption of jurisdiction was to his advantage. 
"As heretofore shown, the jurisdiction of a court over the 
subject matter of a cause of action may be conferred by law, 
and it cannot under any circumstance be conferred on a court, 
as such, by the consent of the parties. It naturally follows 
that if jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent, the want 
thereof cannot be waived by any act of the parties." 
The same rule appears in 13 California Jurisprudence 2d, 
Courts, section 86, page 597: "Where a judicial tribunal has 
no jurisdiction of the subject matter on which it assumes 
to act, its proceedings are absolutely void in the fullest sense 
of the term; and a court, being competent to determine its 
own jluisdiction, may determine that question at any time 
in the proceedings, whenevp.r that fact is made to appear to 
its satisfaction, either before or after jUdgment. Accordingly, 
an objection for want.of such jurisdiction may be raised by 
answer or at any subsequent stage of the proceedings j in fact 
) 
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it may be raised for the first time on appeal. [Mott v. Smith, 
16 Cal. 533; Oreditors v. Oonsumers' Lbr. 00., 98 Cal. 318 
[33 P. 196] ; Mastick v. Superior Oourt, 94 Cal. 347 [29 P. 
869J ; Thompson, In re, 101 Cal. 349 [35 P. 991, 36 P. 98, 508] ; 
People v. Oakland Water Front 00., 118 Cal. 234 [50 P. 305] ; 
San Diego Sav. Bank v. Goodsell, 137 Cal. 420 [70 P. 299].] ... 
"A court should recognize want of jurisdiction over the 
subject matter even if no objection is made. Therefore, when-
ever a want of jurisdiction is suggested, by the court's exami-
nation of the case or otherwise, it is the duty of the court to 
consider it, for if the court is without jurisdiction it is power-
less to act in the case. So fundamental is the necessity that 
a court have jurisdiction of the subject matter, that a lack 
thereof may be raised on appeal or in another proceeding, 
even by the party who invoked the jurisdiction in the first 
place." (Emphasis added.) 
In Matson Navigation 00. v. United States, 284 U.S. 352 
[52 8.Ct. 162, 76 L.Ed. 336], a case arising under the Ad-
miralty Act where exclusive jurisdiction was vested in the 
federal courts, the court said: "As the want of jurisdiction 
is of the subject matter, it may be considered, and appropriate 
judgment given, at any stage of the proceedings, either here 
or below. Hilton v. Dickinson, 108 U.S. 165, 168 [2 8.Ct. 424, 
27 L.Ed. 688] ; Gainesville v. Brown-Orummer Inv. 00., 277 
U.S. 54, 59 [48 8.Ct. 454, 72 L.Ed. 781). See Grace v. Ameri-
can Oentral Ins. 00., 109 U.S. 278, 283-284 [3 S.Ct. 207, 27 
L.Ed. 932] ; Bors v. Preston, 111 U.S. 252, 255 [4 S.Ct. 407, 
28 L.Ed. 419]." 
In Gainesville v. Brown-Orummer Inv. 00., 277 U.S. 54, 
58, 59 [48 S.Ct. 454, 72 L.Ed. 781], the case had been tried 
and appealed in the federal courts. The case went up on 
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. That court 
said: "Objection is first made by the petitioner that there 
was no separable controversy and so no [federal] jurisdiction. 
This question does not seem. 10 have been presented to and 
was certainly not considered by the Oircuit Oourt of Appeals." 
(Emphasis added.) After noting that the question of juris-
diction would seem to have been "abandoned until it is now 
renewed in the briefs in this Court," the court said: "Of 
course a question of jurisdiction can not be waived. Jurisdic-
tion should affirmatively appear, and the question may be 
raised at any time. Grace v. American Oentral Ins. 00., 109 
U.S. 278, 283 [3 B . .Qt. 207, 27 L.Ed. 932]; Manlfield, O. &7 
L. M. R. 00. v. Swan, 111 U.s. 379, 382 [48 8.Ct. 510, 28 
872 148 C.2d 
L.Ed. 462] ; Mattingly v. Nurthweste .... Virginia B. 00., 158 
U.S. 53, 56, 57 [15 S.(,'t. 725, 89 L.Ed. 894]." (Emphasis 
added.) 
Bayna Tom Carmen was found gm1ty of the first degree 
murder of Wllbllr Dan McSwain and with assault with intent 
to murder .Alvin McSwain, Wilbur's brother. On appeal 
this court (People v. Carmen, 36 Cal.2d 768 [228 P.2d 281]) 
reversed the murder ,\onviction and affirmed the conviction 
of assault with intent to (~ommit murder. Subsequently, BayDa 
Tom Carmen was found guilty by a jury of first degree murder 
without recommendation. The judgment wa.'S affirmed by this 
court in August, 1954 (People v. Oarmen, 43 Cal.2d 342 [273 
P.2d 521]). 
On appeal, defendant sought to show by the production 
of additional evidence that both he and the deceased, Wilbur 
Dan McSwain, were Indians and that the crime occurred 
in "Indian country." It was, and is, defendant's argument 
that the above facts vest exdusive jurisdiction in the federal 
,courts. In the majority opinion in People v. Carmen, 43 Cal. 
2d 342, 348 [273 P.2d 521], it was held: "We have concluded 
that the proposed offer to produce additional evidence on the 
appeal should be denied. Furthermore, even assuming that 
additional evidence could be received on appeal in this class 
of eases by stipulation or otherwise, the facts stated in the 
so-called 'stipulation' as well as shown in the entire record 
are insufficient to show exclusive jurisdiction in the federal 
courts." It was also said (at page 349): "The evidence pre-
sented at the trial is not sufficient to permit a determination 
that there is exclusive federal jurisdiction in the present case, 
and we do not pass on the question of what remedies may be 
available to the defendant to show alleged lack of jurisdiction 
in the state court." 
After the filing of the opinion in the above mentioned case 
and a denial of a petition for a rehearing therein, Carmen 
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in which he raised 
the question of lack of jurisdiction in the California courts 
and contended that exclusive jurisdiction was in the federal 
courts. This court issued a writ of hab<;as corpus returnable 
in San Francisco on December 8, 1954. 
State ex reI. Du Fault v. Utecht, 220 Minn. 431 [19 N.W.2d 
706, 161 A.L.R. 1316], is relied upon heavily by the People 
for the proposition ~hat unless the court's lack of jurisdiction 
is clear and undisputable from the face of the record, habeas 
) 
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corpus ought not to be granted to review an erroneous deter-
mination by a court that it has territorial jurisdiction over an 
offense and that, in general, an applicant for habeas corpus 
in such a case will be left to his remedy by writ of error or 
appeal. 
In the first instance there are s('!veral distjnguishing features 
between the case under consideration and the Utecht case. 
First, Utecht cUd flOt raise the question of jUNscUction on 
oppeal t.I$ did Cormen in the instant case; ,econdly, ",hile 
Utecht ",as a Chippewa Indian, the crime ",as committed (ac-
cording to the court) upon on Indian allotment for ",hick. 
trust patent kacl been issued. The crime in the Carmen case 
was ~ouunitted on the Maggie Jim Allotment but the land 
was at that time still held in trust by the United States govern-
ment and no fee patent had bf.ltm istIued. (It was issued, subse-
quent to the crime, in 1952.) 
While it is difficult to ascertain the exact holding in the 
Utecht case, the following statement (page 707) appears to 
recognize that had no fee patent been issued, a different solu-
tion might have been reached: "The facts ,et out in peti-
tioner', opplication for the "'"t of kabeas corpus, if true, 
w01dd deprive the state courts of jurisdiction in this matter. 
A 'tate', jurisdiction does not eztenil over individual member, 
of on Indian tr~De in ,o-coUed 'Indian country.' State 'Y. 
Jackson, 218 Mjnn. 429 [16 N.W.2d 752] .••• 
"In the original proceedings before the district court of 
Carlton county, there is no reference to the fact that the place 
where the crime was committed was within an Indian reserva-
tion on an Indian allotment, and no reference to the fact that 
relator is a member of the Chippewa tribe of Indians and a 
ward of the government, except that at the pre-sentence 
examination relator was asked by the court: 
" 'Let's see: Do you belong to the Chippewa tribe: A. 
Yes.' " 
The Utecht case was, apparently, decided on the theory 
that defendant should havl'~-brought thE' court's lack of juris-
diction (although this is· dubious sillce the crime was com-
mitted on land to which a patent in fee bad been issued and 
was, hence, no Jonger Indian country) to the attention of the 
court on appeal. Utecht did not perfect an appeal. Carmen 
sought to have the matter determined on appeal. It will be 
recalled that a majority of this court determined (43 Ca1.2d 
342) that Carmen's'''proposed offer to produce additional en-
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dence on the appeal should be denied. Furthermore, even l 
assuming that additional evidence couId be received on appeal I 
in this class of cases by stipulation or otherwise, the facta il 
stated in the so-called 'stipulation' as well as shown in the 
entire record are insufficient to show exclusive jurisdiction \ 
in the federal courts. . • • . I 
"The evidence presented at the trial is not sufficient to 1\ 
permit a determination that there is exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion in the present case, and we do not pass on the question of 
what remedies may be aoo,,'labZe to the defendant to .how 
alleged lack of jurisdiction in the ,tate court. Nothing in 
the record indicates that the location of the crime was 'Indian 
country' within the meaning of any of the statutes which have 
been cited. (See e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1152,1153, and 3242.) 
While there was evidence that defendant and the victim were i 
'Indians,' the use of this term, without more, shows only that 
the persons were Indians by race and blood." (Emphasis 
added.) We know, therefore, that tke fo,ct that defendant and 
the deceased were bDth Indians appeared on the face of 1M 
record. 
It is of interest to note that m the courts of the United 
States (see discussion, supra), there may be a juclicial inquiry 
into the very truth and substance of the causes of a defendant'. 
detention although it may become necessary to look behind 
and beyond· the record of his conviction to a suflicient extent 
to test the jurisdiction of the state court to proceed to a judg-
ment against him. (Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 466-468 
[58 S.Ct. 1019,82 L.Ed. 1461, 146 A.L.R. 357]; Wong Doo v. 
United States, 265 U.S. 239 [44 S.Ct. 524, 68 L.Ed. 999]; 
Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224 [44 S.Ct. 519,68 L.Ed. 989].) 
The Utecht case, while factually very similar, has really 
no application to the case at bar. A majority of this CDUrt 
refused to permit Carmen to produce additional eVidtMe on 
appeal on the question of jurisdiction of the subject matter; 
there was no appeal in the Utecht case where that court held 
the question of jurisdiction should have been considered. The 
crime in the Carmen case was committed in Indian country; 
in the Utecht case, a patent in fee had been issued (see the 
various cases cited infra holding that an Indian is emancipated 
when he has received a patent in fee to land; and section 349. 
title 25, U.S.C.A., which provides that when the lands have been 
so conveyed "then .each and every allottee shall have the bene-
fit of and be subject to the laws, both civil and criminal, of the 
) 
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State or Territory in which they may reside ..•. ") In 
Minnesota there is an appeal from the denial of a petition for 
a writ of habeas corpus and there may not be successive peti-
tions for the writ on the same set of facts. Such is not the 
law in California. 
In State ex reI. Irvine v. ~strict Court, 125 Mont. 398 [239 
P.2d 272, 275], the accused was an Indian. The crime of 
burglary committed on an Indian reservation was involved. 
The Montana court held that it had no jurisdiction in that 
exclusive jurisdiction was in :the federal courts; that defend~ 
ant was an Indian and a ward of the government. It was 
held that the question of jurisdiction "should be inquired into 
by the court at the earliest inception on its own initiative 
to ascertain whether that particular court has jurisdiction of 
that class of offense. In re Coy, 127 U.S. 731, 758 [8 S.Ot. 
1263, 32 L.Ed. 274] ; Barnes v. Hunter, 10 Cir., 188 F.2d 86, 
89; Tooisgah v. United States, 10 Cir., 186 F.2d 93, 96. 
u It should be kept in mind that all congressional legislation 
relative to Indians and Indian affairs has been initiated and 
enacted for the benefit of the Indian. As was stated by the 
supreme ('ourt, 'According to a familiar rule, legislation af-
fecting the Indians is to be construed in their interest, and 
a purpose to make a radical departure is not· lightly to be 
inferred.' United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 599, 600 [36 
S.Ct. 696, 698, 60 L.Ed. 1192]. 
" 'The policy of leaving Indians free from state jurisdic-
tion and control is deeply rooted in the Nation's history.' 
Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 [65 S.Ct. 989, 89 L.Ed. 1367]." 
It was also held that .. Exclusive jurisdiction over the Indian 
for this purpose has always been claimed and asserted by 
the general government, on the ground that the Indian is a 
ward thereof, and dependent thereon, and until fully emanci-
pated and discharged from that condition, Title 25, § 349, 
U.S.C.A., the federal government continlles to assert its ex-
clusive jurisdiction to punish its ward for the committing 
of the enumerated offenses." ... 
With the above rules in mind, on May 26, 1955, this court 
made an order of reference propounding certain question~ 
t.o counsel for petitioner Carmen and the attorney general. 
Pursuant to said order, hearing'~ were beld and testimony 
taken at Sacramento on December 14. 1955, at Madera on 
February 20, 1956, and at San QUE'ntin on February 2~, 1956. 
On May 17, 1956,'the referee, the Honorable John P. McMur. 
"') 
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ray, Judge of the Superior Court of Inyo County, California, 
filed with this court the following findings:· 
"1. Did Haytia Tom Carmen and Wilbur Dan McSwain 
belong to a tribe or tribes of Indians' If so, the extent, nature 
and character of the tribal organization. 
"Your Referee finds that Rayna Tom Carmen and Wilbur 
Dan McSwain did belong to a tribe of Indians, namely, the I 
Mono Indians who live in the North Fork area in Madera I 
County in this state. 
liThe extent, nature and charact.er of the tribal organiza. I 
tion to which these men belonged was a loose type of tribal 
organization which, however, has its own language. Perhaps 
the main distinguishing tribal feature is a primitive burial \' 
ceremony upon the death of a member of the tribe. 
The tribe is divided into two classes, the Eagles and the II 
Coyotes. If a Coyote dies, the Eagles render certain services I 
at his funeral and vice versa. The squaws, if a member of the 
family dies, cut their hair short during the funeral. The 
funeral consists in a celebration of several days at which I 
there is a great deal of crying and some singing. A year after I 
the funeral ceremony the members of the family of the de· I 
ceased abstain from eating meat or greasy foods for twenty. ! 
four hours and before a second ceremony begins the partici. I 
pants in the ceremony wash their faces with a gray odoriferous I!' 
weed which is called 'sorrop' in the Mono language. Some 
members of the tribe still weave baskets of distinctive de-
signs and use the cradleboard of 'hoops' in which to carry 
babies. These cradleboards are woven in such a manner 
as to allow the sex of the child to be put on the eyeshade after 
the child is born. The child's sex is indicated by a tribal 
pattern, one indicating that the baby is a boy and the' other 
indicating that the baby is a girl. The members of the tribe 
at times meet in order to raise money to protect their interests 
as Indians. The meetings are held as a tribal matter, but the 
protection sought is as California Indians, not as Mono 
Indians. They also hold social gatherings several times a year 
which are restricted to the merebers of the tribes. It is cus-
tomary for members of the tribe to collect acorns which are 
ground into flour and meal and are baked into bread. They 
also consider the butterfly worm as a delicate item of diet. 
• A majority of thi8 eourt now nently Bidesteps the ilndings of the 
Referee on the questi9Iis propounded by Btating that it iB unneee8sary 
to diseuBs the question of whether the evidenee is Buffieient to Bupport 
the findinil. 
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"2. Were petitioner Rayna Tom Carmen and Wilbur Dan 
McSwain listed on the census roll of Indians of California 
kept by the United States Department of Interior, Bureau 
of Indian Affairs, as members of an Indian tribe' 
"Yes, both Rayna Tom Carmen and Wilbur Dan McSwain 
were listed on the census roll of the Indians of California 
kept by the United States Department of Interior, Bureau of 
Indian Affairs as members of the Mono tribe of Indians. The 
name of Wilbur Dan McSwain, however, was later removed in 
accordance with a 1950 amendment dealing with Indians listed 
on the census roll. - In order to be eligible for enrollment a 
person must have proof of ancestry which goes back to 1852. 
The main purpose of this census roll is to determine eligibility 
for any land assignment. 
"3. If either of them belonged to a tribe of Indians did 
they or either of them sever tribal relations or become other-
wise emancipated from his tribe' 
"Neither of the named persons ever severed tribal relations 
or became otherwise emancipated from his tribe. 
"4. Had the Department of Indian Affairs acted in any 
way toward defendant Rayna Tom Carmen or the victim of 
the homicide, Wilbur Dan McSwain' 
"The Department of Indian Affairs appeared in the Su-
preme Court informally on behalf of defendant Rayna Tom 
Carmen, but there is no evidence that it at any time acted 
in any way toward the victim of the homicide, Wilbur Dan 
McSwain. The department collected and delivered to Car-
men's mother his distributive share of a judgment obtained 
for certain California Indians at a time after his conviction 
which led to his present incarceration. Rayna Tom Carmen 
also attended the Federal Indian School at Stewart, Nevada. 
near Carson City, a federally operated Indian school, and 
subsequently went to the Sherman Institute, a federally oper-
ated Indian school in Riverside County, California. 
"5. To what extent if any did the Department of Indian 
Mairs exercise supervisiop over the place of abode or manner 
in which these parties lived' 
"The Department of Indian Affairs did not exercise any 
supervision over the place of abode or manner of life of 
• 'j'he transeript of the hearings on referenee showlI, at page 15, that 
Wilbur Dan MeSwain's name was removed beeause of his death. Hi, 
death oeeurred on April 22, 1950. An amendment was passed on Yay 
24, 1950 whieh provideil that persons "must be livin.e on the date of 
the Ad in order to,be enroUed." 
) 
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either of these parties, but there is testimony that it never \'1 
acts in such manner with any California Indians. 
"6. Had there been any agreement between the United 
States and the tribes to which they belonged' \ 
"There had never been any agreement between the United i 
States and the tribe to which either of these parties belonged. 
"7. Had either of these parties ever received an allotment 
of land because he was an Indian or of Indian descent' If so, 
what if any disposition has been made of snch land' 
"Neither party had ever received any allotment of land 
because he was an Indian or of Indian descent. Therefore, 
no disposition was ever made of any snch land." 
Mr. Linn, Assistant Attorney General, stipulated at the 
first hearing on reference (page 3 of the transcript) that "the 
United States of America did, on November 26, 1920, issue an 
allotment to the foregoing described lands [where the crime 
was committed] to Maggie Jim, a Mono Indian, that said 
described lands at all times have been and are now· held in 
trust by the United States of America." It was also stipulated 
by counsel that this allotment was not part of, nor had it been 
part of, an Indian reservation. 
The only real question here involved is whether the federal 
government in 1950, the year in which the crime occurred, 
had exclusive jurisdicton over crimes of this type in any ease ' 
involving Indians and Indian country. This question is also 
bypassed by a majority of this court because of its holding 
that lack of jurisdiction must appear on the face of the record 
in order to entitle a petitioner to its benefits unless· unusual 
circumstances appear and that there are no such unusual cir-
cumstances in the ease at bar. I have heretofore shown that 
this court admitted (43 Ca1.2d 342, 349) that 4C there was evi-
dence that defendant and the victim were' Indians,' " and the 
location of the crime was also in evidence at the time of trial 
although it may not have been specifically referred to as 
Indian Country it was referred to as the "Maggie Jim Allot-
ment. " I am of the opinion, therefore, .that even by adopting 
the restrictive rule of the scope of habeas corpus subscribed 
to by the majority (and which, in my view, overrules the 
more liberal and salutary rules ef In re Bell, 19 Ca1.2d 488 
[122 P.2d 22], and In 1'e Connor, 16 Ca1.2d 701 [108 P.2d 
10] ), Carmen was entitled to have the question of the juris-
• Subsequent to the crime, in 1952, a fee patent to this land was 
i8sued to Dan MeSwpn, the father of the victim Wilbur Dan Me-
Swahl, and the husband of Maigie Jim. 
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diction of the California court determined. One is surely 
deprived of a substantial constitutional right when he is tried, 
found guilty, and sentenced by a court having no jurisdic-
tion of the subject matter I 
Defendant argues that the state court was without juris-
diction in this case and that exclusive jurisdiction was vested 
in the United States and its courts by reason of sections 1151, 
1152, 1153, and 3242 of the United States Code Annotated, as 
amended May 24, 1949. (U.S.C.A., tit. 18.) With this con-
tention I agree. 
Section 1151 provides as follows: cc Except as otherwise 
provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this title [those sections 
have reference to sales of liquor to Indians and the definition 
of the term 'Indian country' as it relates to the liquor laws], 
the term 'Indian country,' as used in this chapter, means (a) 
all lands within the limits of any Indian reservation under the 
jurisdiction of the United States government, notwithstand-
ing the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way 
running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian 
communities within the borders of the United States whether 
within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, 
and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) 
all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been 
extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the 
~ame." (Emphasis added; June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 
757, amended May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 25, 63 Stat. 94.) 
Taking the problem here involved step by step, it has been 
stipulated that the crime was committed on an Indian allot-
ment, the Indian title to which had not been extinguished at 
the time of the crime. The People argue that in order for 
such an allotment to come within the definition of "Indian 
country" it must have been part, at one time, of an Indian 
reservation. This argument stems from House Report Num-
ber 314, 80th Co~gress, page 492, wherein it is stated that 
Indian allotments were included in the definition of Indian 
country on the authority Of United States v. Pelican, 232 
U.S. 442 [34 S.Ct. 396, 58 L.Ed. 676]. In the Pelican case, a 
full blood Indian was murdered on land allotted to one Agnes, 
an Indian. The allotment had formerly been part of the Col-
ville Indian reservation which, with certain exceptions, had 
been, by Act of Congress (July 1, 1892, ch. 140, 27 Stat. 62) 
'vacated and restored to the public domain. The ~ceptions 
were made by Congress to care for the Indians residing on 
that portion of the reservation. Each Indian was entitled to 
) 
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select 80 acres which was allotted to him in severalty, the title 
being held in trust for his benefit for 25 years and then trans- i 
ferred in fee to him or his heirs. During the trust period, the ' 
lands Were inalienable. 
The People's position is that because the allotted lands 
were once l'art of an Indian reservation they were considered 
by the court to continue to be IndialJ country. The District 
Court in the Pelican case had held that the Agnes allotment 
was not Indian country within the meaning of the statute. 
The Supreme Court reversed. It was said at page 447: "Al-
though the lands were allotted in severalty, they were to he 
held in trust by the United States for 25 years for the sole 
use and benefit of the allottee, or his heirs, and during this 
period were to be inalienable. That the lands, being so held, 
continued to be under the jurisdiction and control of Congress 
for all governmental purposes relating to the guardianship 
and protection of the Indians, is not open to controversy. 
United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432, 437 [23 S.Ot. 478, 47 
L.Ed. 532]; McKay v. Kalyton, 204 U.S. 458, 466, 468 [27 
S.Ct. 346, 51 L.Ed. 566] ; Couture v. United States, 207 U.S. 
581 [28 S.Ct. 259, 52 L.Ed. 350] ; United Sfa.tes v. Celestine, 
215 U.S. 278, 290, 291 [30 S.Ot. 93, 54 L.Ed. 195]; United 
States v. Sutton, 215 U.S. 291 [30 S.Ot. 116, 54 L.Ed. 200] ; 
Marckie'Tiger v. Western Invest. Co., 221 U.S. 286, 315, 816 I 
[31 s.Ot. 578, 55 L.Ed. 738] ; Hallowell v. United States, 221 
U.S. 317 [81 S.Ot. 587, 55 L.Ed. 750] ; United States v. Wright, 
229 U.S. 226, 237 [33 S.Ct. 630, 57 L.Ed. 1160J." It was 
further held (page 449) that "The lands, which, prior to the 
allotment, undoubtedly formed part of the Indian country 
[as a reservation], still retain during the trust period a dis-
tinctively Indian character, being devoted to Indian occu-
pancy under the limitations imposed by Federal legislation. 
The explicit provision in the act of 1897, as to allotmerits, we 
do not regard as pointing a distinction, but rath("T as em-
phasizing the intent of Congress in carrying out its policy 
with respect to allotments in severalty where these have been 
accompanied with restrictions upon alienation or provision 
for trusteeship on the part of the Government. In the present 
case, the original reservation was Indian country simply be-
cause it had been validly set apart for the'use of the Indians 
as such, under the superintendence of the Government. Don-
neUy v. United States, supra [228 U.S. 243 (33 S.Ct. 449, 57 
L.Ed. 820, Ann.Case. 1913E 710)]. The same considerations, 
in substance, apply 'to the allotted lands which, when the 
) 
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reservation was diminished, were excepted from the portion 
restored to the public domain. 'l'he allottees were permitted 
to enjoy a more secure tenure, Bnd provision was made for 
their ultimate ownership without restrictions. But, mean-
whue, the lands remained Indian lands, sct apart for Indians 
under governmental care j lind we arc unable to find ground 
for the conclusion that they became utber than Indian country 
through the distribution into separate holdings, the Govern-
ment retaining control 
"It is said that it is not to be Fmpposed that Congress 
has intended to maintain the Federal jurisdiction over hun-
dreds of allotments scattered through territory other portions 
of which were open to white settlement. But Congress ex-
pressly so provided with respect to offenses committed in 
violation of the act of 1897. Nor does the territorial jurisdic-
tion of the United StnttJs dependapon the size of the particular 
areas which are held for Federal :mrposes (Criminl11 Code, 
§ 272). It must be remembered that the fundamental c0n-
sideration is the protect'ion of a dependent people." (Emphasis 
added.) The court continul')d and after explicitly noting that 
Congress amended the original act to provide" That until the 
issuance of fee-I'imple pat.ents an allottees to whom trust 
patents shall hereafter be issucd shall he subject to the ex-
clusive jurisdiction of the United States" ~section 349, title 
25, U.S.C.A. continues to so provide) said: "We deem it to 
be clear that Congr~ss had the power thus to continue the 
guardianship of the Government. {UnUed States v. Kagama, 
118 U.S. 375, 383, 384 [6 S.Ot. 1109, 30 L.Ed. 228] j United 
States v. Oelestine, 3upra j lIfarchie Tiger v. Western Invest. 
00., supra j Hallowell y. United States, supra; Heckman v. 
United States" 224 U.S. 413, 437 {32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820] ; 
Ex parte Webb, 225 U.S. 663, 683 [32 S.Ct. 769, 56 L.Ed. 
1248] j United States Y. Wright, supra; United States v. San-
doval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 {34 S.Ct. 1, 58 L.Ed. 7] ; Perrin v. United 
States, decided this day, post, p. 478 [232 U.S. 478 (34 S.Ot. 
387, 58 L.Ed. 697)]); and these provisions leave no room for 
doubt as to the inteTlt of Congress with respect to the mainte-
nance of the J!"ederal jurisdiction over the allotted lands de-
scribed in the indictment." 
The foregoing quotations from the Pelican case show that 
the case did not stand for the proposition that allotments 
must be carved from Indiau reservations before they could be 
considered as falling within the definition of Indian p.ountry. 
"It must be remembered that the fundamental consideration 
) 
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is the protection of a dependent people." Section 334, title l 
25, U.S.C.A. provides for allotments to Indians" not residing 
npon a reservation, or for whose tribe no reservation has been 
provided by treaty, Act of Congress, or Executive order ... 
and patents shall be issued to them for such lands in the 
manner and with the restrictions as provided in sections 348 
and 349." Section 349 provides that" At the expiration of 
the trust period and when the lands have been conveyed to the 
Indians by patent in fee, as provided in section 348, then each 
and every allottee shall have the benefit of and be subject to 
the laws, both civil and criminal, of the State or Territory 
in which they may reside ... Provided further, That until 
the issuance of fee-simple patents all allottees to whom trust 
pateuts shall be issued shall be subject to the exclusive juris-
diction of the United States .... " (Emphasis added.) It 
clearly appears that neither Congress, nor the Supreme Court 
in the Pelican case, intended that the jurisdiction of the 
United States over land held in allotment should differ de-
pending upon whether that land had once been part of an 
Indian reservation. 
The contrary appears to be true in light of the Pelican 
case. In that case the argument was that because the land 
where the crime occurred was at the time of the crime allotted 
to an Indian rather than still part of a reservation it was 
no longer "Indian country." The court's entire opinion is 
devoted to showing that allotted land, the title to which 
was still held in trust by the government, was under the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the government for the protection 
of the Indian enjoying the use and benefit thereof. 
The People rely on United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535 
[58 S.Ot. 286, 82 L.Ed. 410], for the proposition that a state 
may exercise its criminal jurisdiction over the "same crimi-
nal act" and that the federal government does not assert 
exclusive jurisdiction in a situation such as we have here. 
In the McGowan case the court stated (p. 536) that the only 
question for determination was whether the Reno Indian 
Colony was Indian country so far as regulation of the sale 
of intoxicants to Indians was concerned. It was held (p. 
537, et seq.) that "The words 'Indian country' have ap-
peared in the statutes relating to Indians for more than a . 
century. We must consider 'the changes which have taken 
place in our situation, with a view of determining from time 
to time what must b'e regarded as Indian country where it is 
spoken of in the statutes.' Also, due regard must be given 
) 
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to the fact that from an early period of our history, the Gov-
ernment has prescribed severe penalties to enforce laws 
regulating the sale of liquor on lands occupied by Indians 
under government supervision. Indians of the Reno Colony 
have been established in homes under the supervision and 
guardianship of the United States. The policy of Congress, 
uniformly enforced through the decisions of this Court, has 
been to regulate the liquor traffic with Indians occupying 
such a settlement. This protection is extended by the United 
States 'over all dependent Indian communities witkin its 
borders, whether within its original territory or territory 
subsequently acquired, and wketkerwithin or without the 
limits of (J 8tate.' {Italics added.] 
"The fundamental consideration of both Congress and the 
Department of the Interior in establishing this colony has 
been the protection of a dependent people. Indians in this 
colony have been afforded the same protection by the govern-
ment as that given Indians in other settlements known as 
'reservations.' Congress alone has the right to determine the 
manner in which this country's guardianship over the Indians 
shall be carried out, and it is immaterial whether Congress 
designates (J settlement as a 'reservation' or 'colony.' In the 
case of United 8tates v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442, 449 [34 S.Ct. 
396, 58 L.Ed. 676], this Court said: 
" 'In the present case the original reservation was Indian 
country simply because 'it had. been ooUdly set apart for tke 
use of the Indians as suck, under the superintendence of the 
Government.' [Italics added.] 
"The Reno Colony has been validly set apart for the use 
of the Indians. It is under the superintendence of the Govern-
ment. The Government retains title to the lands which it 
permits the Indians to occupy. The Government has authority 
to enact regulations and protective laws respecting this terri-
tory. I ••• Congress possesses the broad power of legislating 
for the protection of the Indians wherever they may be within 
the territory of the United States .•• ' United 8tatu v. 
Ramsey, 271 U.S. 467, 471 [46 8.Ct. 559,70 L.Ed. 1039]. 
"When we view the facts of this case in the light of the 
relationship which has long existed between the Government 
and the Indians-and which continues to date-it is not rea.-
sonably possible to draw any distinction between this Indian 
'colony' and 'Indian country.' We conclude that section 247 
of Title 25, supra, 40es apply to the Reno Colony. 
II The federal prohibition against taking intoxicants into 
) 
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tIda Indian colony does not deprive the State of Nevada of its 
sovereignty over the area in question. The Federal Govern-
ment does not, assert exclusive jurisdiction within the colony. 
Enactments of the Federal Government passed to protect and 
guard .f, Indian wards only affect the operation, within the 
colony, of such state laws as conflict with the federal enact-
ments." (Emphasis added.) 
It should be noted that the McGowan case does not even 
consider whether or not the "Colony" was once part of an 
Indian reservation. It is specifically stated that the Colony 
consists of approximately 28 acres of land, title to which was 
in the United States, and that the colony was created to 
provide homes for needy Indians. 
It follows, therefore, that title to the land here involved, 
known as the Maggie Jim Allotmant, was still held in trust 
by the United States government at the time the crime was 
committed and that it falls within the statutory definition 
of "Indian country." (U.S.C.,A. title 18, § 1151.) 
Section 1152 [U.S.C.,A., title 18] provides: "Laws govern-
ing. 
"Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general 
laws of the United States as to the punishment of offenses com-
mitted in any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction 
of the United States, except the District of Columbia, shall 
extend to the Indian country. ' 
"This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one 
Indian against the person or property of another Indian, 
nor to any Indian committing any offense in the Indian 
country who has been punished by the local law of the tribe, 
or to any ca~e where, by treaty stipulations, the exclusive 
jurisdiction over such offenses is or may be secured to the 
Indian tribes respectively." 
Section 1158 provides in pertinent part: "Offenses com-
mitted within Indian country. 
"Any Indian who commits against the person or property 
of another Indian or other person any of the following of. 
fenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, rape, incest, assault 
with intent to kill, assault with a dangerous weapon, arson, 
burglary, robbery, and larceny within the Indian country, 
shall be subject to the same laws and penalties as all other 
persons committing any of the above oiIenses, within the 
6uZusive jurisdiction of the United States." (The second 
paragraph of this section relates to rape j the third paragraph 
to burglary. Both ..Pl'bvide that the crimes shall be defined 
) 
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as provided by the laws of the state in which they are com-
mitted. Burglary is to be punished in accordance with the 
laws of the state in which it is committed.) (June 25, 1948, 
ch. 645, 62 Stat. 758, amended May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 26, 63 
Stat. 94.) (Emphasis added.) 
Section 3242 provides that: "All Indians committing any 
of the following offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, rape, 
incest, assault with intent to kill, assault with a dangerous 
weapon, arson, burglary, robbery, and larceny on and within 
the Indian ccun~ry, shall be tried in the same courts, and in 
the same manner, as are all other persons committing any of 
the above crimes within the excluS'it, jurisdiction of the 
United States." (Emphasis added; June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 
62 Stat. 827, amended May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 51, 63 Stat. 96.) 
As hereinbefore set forth, the referee found that both 
petitioner and the victim, Wilbur Dan McSwain, were Mono 
Indians tind that both were listed as such on the census roll 
of Indians of California kept by the United States Depart-
ment of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs. 
The People argue that an Indian who has become emanci· 
pated in some manner from his tribe is to be treated as a 
non-Indian for the purpose of jurisdiction in a case such as 
this, and there are cases so holding. In Eugene Sol Louie v. 
United States, 274 F. 47, the emancipation of the Indian 
took place when he received a patent in fee to land; -in People 
v. Ketchum, 73 Cal. 635 [15 P. 353], the defendant was held 
not to be a member of any Indian tribe; in State v. Bush, 195 
Minn. 413 [263 N.W. 300], the defendant Indian held land 
by a patent in fee; -in State v. Monroe, 83 Mont. 556 [274 
P. 840], defendant Indian held land by a patent in fee; -in 
Peopu ex ret Schuyler v. Livingstone, 123 Misc. 605 [205 
N.Y.S. 888], defendant was an Indian, but not a member 
of any tribe; in State v. Nimrod, 30 S.D. 239 [138 N.W. 377], 
defendant was an Indian and held land by patent in fee under 
the Dawes Act; -in State v. Howard, 33 Wash. 250 [74 P. 
382], the defendant was an Indian but not a member of any 
tribe. In the case under consideration, neither the defendant 
Carmen, nor the deceased McSwain, had ever received a patent 
in fee from the government or had been otherwise emanci-
pated in any way. 
Despite the specific finding of the referee that neither of 
the two Indians involved had ever been emaneipated or had 
severed tribal relations from the tribe to which they be-
• See aection S49,,"I'itle 25, U.S.C.A., heretofore quoted. 
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longed, the People argue that they were ., emancipated" 
Indians; that neither of them was ever controlled in any way 
by the Bureau of Indian Affairs or by the Indian organiza-
tion. It is contended that both Carmen and the deceased 
McSwain were free to do as they pleased without interfer-
ence from either the federal government or by an Indian 
agent. The referee specifically pointed out that the Depart-
ment of Indian Affairs does not exercise supervision over 
any California Indians. These arguments of the People are 
without merit in view of the referee's findings and the evi-
dence supporting them. The record also shows that the Mono 
Indians (including Carmen and McSwain) lived in "tribal 
ways"; that they have a "chief"; and that they have "meet-
ings once in a while of their own"; that the burial service is 
referred to as a "powwow" (Transcript on Reference, pp. 
46,47). 
The People also contend that the case of United States v. 
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 [6 S.Ct. 1109, 30 L.Ed. 228], with its 
wardship theory, is obsolete. From this it is argued that 
because Indians are now citizens of the United States and 
of the state in which they reside (U.S.C.A., tit. 8, § 1401 
[formerly tit. 8, §§ 601, 604] ; Anderson v. Mathews, 174 Cal. 
537 [163 P. 902] ; Piper v. Big Pine School Dist., 193 Cal. 
664 [226 P. 926]) they should be subject to the laws of the 
state in which they reside. It is said, with merit, that Con-
gress itself has recognized the change in the condition of 
the California Indian in that it has expressly stated that 
California has jurisdiction over crimes by Indians in Indian 
country within the state. Public Law 280 was passed by the 
first session of the S3rd Congress, 1953, giving to California 
jurisdiction in such situations. The fact remains, however, 
that at the time the crime in question was committed Oongress 
had fWt seen fit to so act. 
The statutes here involved, which in my opinion provide 
for exclusive jurisdiction of the federal court in cases such 
as this, have a background of wisdom and foresight. Those 
conversant with the early history of the western states will 
recall the bitter conflicts between the native Indians and the 
white immigrants who first settled these states. As a result 
of the bitterness engendered by these struggles a strong feel-
ing of prejudice existed against the remaining Indian popu-
lation after the white man became master of the western 
domain and established an organized system of government 
therein. The early' history of California is replete with in-
) 
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stances in wllich native Indians were denied redress in our 
courts because of this prejudice. As a result of thissitua-
tion, which is well known to those whose memories go back 
two or three generations, the federal government saw fit, in 
the administration of its wardship over the remaining Indian 
population, to provide that the federal courts should have 
exclusive jurisdiction in cases such as this and thereby re-
moved the Indian from whatever disadvantage he might have 
by being prosecuted in state courts in an area where prejudice 
against the Indian might still exist. These statutes remained 
in effect so far as California is concerned until 1953 which 
was long after the commission of the crime here involved. 
It appears from the foregoing that since defendant Rayna 
Tom Carmen and the victim, Wilbur Dan McSwain, were 
unemancipated Mono Indians and that the Maggie Jim Allot-
ment on which the crime occurred was Indian country, the 
Superior Court in and for the County of Madera, State of 
California, was without jurisdiction to try defendantRayna 
Tom Carmen for the crimes with which he was charged. 
For the foregoing reasons the prisoner should be discharged. 
TRAYNOR, Concurring and Dissenting.-I concur in the 
holding of the court insofar as it constitutes a rule of decision 
for the disposition of cases arising in the future". It is clear, 
however, from the authoriti",s cited in both the majority and 
the dissenting opinion that the question of the availability of 
habeas corpus to attack subject matter jurisdiction by proof 
of facts outside the record has been clouded in uncertainty 
in this state. (See also Edmonds, J., concurring, In re BeU, 
19 Ca1.2d 488, 506-507 [122 P.2d 22] ; In re Wyatt, 114 Cal. 
App. 557, 562 [300 P. 132] ; 1 Witkin, California Procedure, 
Jurisdiction, § 162, pp. 429-430.) The United States Supreme 
Court appears to have recognized a similar uncertainty with 
respect to the federal rule. (See Rice v. Olson, 824 U.S. 786, 
791 [65 S.Ct. 989, 89 L.Ed. 1867].) In Phelan v. Superior 
Court, 85 Cal.2d 363 [21'( P.2d 951], this court considered 
the effect of uncertainty·in the law as to the adequacy of the 
remedy by appeal on the right to attack an order of the trial 
court by writ of mandate. It stated: "In view of the un-
certainty which has existed in the law with respect to the 
appealability of the order in question and also in view of the 
holdings of this court that an appeal is not adequate in a case 
of this type, petiti<lner should not be denied the use of the 
writ because of his failure· to appeal. It would obviously 
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be a hardship upon a litigant who has been misled by such un-
certainty in the law if we were to resolve the uncertainty 
and in the same proceeding deny his petition for a writ on the 
ground that he in fact did have an adequate remedy by ap-
peal." (35 Ca1.2d at 871-872; see also In re Bine, 47 Ca1.2d 
814, 818 [306 P.2d 445].) Similarly, the uncertainty that 
has existed as to the availability of the writ of habeas corpus 
to attack the jurisdiction of the trial court in a case of this 
sort should preclude holding concurrently with the resolution 
of that uncertainty that such an attack can only be made in 
the trial court, at least when. as in this case, petitioner's at-
tempt to raise th~ issue on appeal ml1kes clear that he has 
not sought to abuse the remedy by delaying the attack until 
conviction in the federal courts would become difficult or 
impossible. 
I concur in the conclusiOJ.1 of Justice Carter that the evi-
dence taken before the referee establishes that the Superior 
Court in and for the County of Madera, State of California, 
was without jurisdiction to try petitioner for the crimes with 
which he was charged, and accordingly, I would discharge the 
prisoner. 
SCHAUER, J., Diss<!nting. -Notwithstanding the long eon-
tinued contest in the litigation before us it appears to me 
that there is no real basis for debate on the controlling issue. 
If \Ve had a record disclosing a substantial conflict in evidence 
as to the facts upon which state jurisdiction depends then 
the majority conclusion ",uuld be tenable. But we have no 
such record. 
Upon the facts shown, the Constitution (art. VI, § 2) and 
laws (18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1151, 1152, 1153, 8242) of the 
United States opp.rate to vest exclusive jurisdiction of the 
subject matter of this case-the penal responsibility of the 
petitioner for the act aUegp,dly constituting the crime for 
which he was tried and convicted-in the courts of the United 
States. Jurisdiction of the subject ITIatter of an action is 
vested in, or prohibitp.d to, a court by the Constitution, federal 
or state, and as may be defiDPd or implemented by statutes 
which do not transgress constitutional limits. (See Harring-
ton v. 8uperior Court (1924), 194 Cal. 185, 188 [2] [228 
P. 15] ["Jurisdiction in any proceeding is conferred by law; 
that is, by the constitution or by statute"].) Jurisdiction of 
the subjp.ct matter exjsts by law or it does not exist and can-
not be acquired. (See 8cklyen v. 8c'hlJ/en (1954), 43Cal.2d 
\ 
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361, 375 [17] [273 P.2d 897] ; Taylor v. Taylor (1923), 192 
Cal. 71, 78 [6] [218 P. 756, 51 A.L.R. 1074] ["Neither a 
party, nor both parties, can vest a court with jurisdil!tion to 
which it is a strallger"] ; King v. Kutner-Goldstein Co. (1901), 
135 Cal. 65, 67 [67 P. 10]; Cosia v. Banta (1950), 98 Cal. 
App.2d 181, 182 [2] [219 P.2d 478] ; Higgins v. Coyne (1946), 
75 Cal.App.2d 69, 70 [1] [170 P.2d 25] ; Glass v. Bank of 
America etc. Assn. (1936), 17 Ca1.App.2d 645, 647 [3] [62 
P.2d 764] ; Mannix v. Superior Court (1933), 133 Ca1.App. 
740, 743 [3] [24 P.2d 507] ["A court cannot, by presuming 
to act, invest itself with jurisdiction"].) "[ J] udicial duty 
is not less fitly performed by declining ungranted jurisdic-
tion [or, here, jurisdiction which the Congress has declared 
is in the federal courts] than in exercising firmly that which 
the Constitution and the laws confer." (Ex parte McCardle 
(1868),7 Wall. (U.S.) 506,515 [19 L.Ed. 264].) 
Since by force of federal law jurisdiction over petitioner's 
act and his penal responsibility therefor is vested in the fed-
eral courts and therefore prohibited to California the peti-
tioner is entitled to discharge from state custody. 
